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How Random Noise and a Graphical Convention Subverted Behavioral Scientists'
Explanations of Self-Assessment Data: Numeracy Underlies Better Alternatives
Abstract
Despite nearly two decades of research, researchers have not resolved whether people generally perceive
their skills accurately or inaccurately. In this paper, we trace this lack of resolution to numeracy,
specifically to the frequently overlooked complications that arise from the noisy data produced by the
paired measures that researchers employ to determine self-assessment accuracy. To illustrate the
complications and ways to resolve them, we employ a large dataset (N = 1154) obtained from paired
measures of documented reliability to study self-assessed proficiency in science literacy. We collected
demographic information that allowed both criterion-referenced and normative-based analyses of selfassessment data. We used these analyses to propose a quantitatively based classification scale and
show how its use informs the nature of self-assessment. Much of the current consensus about peoples'
inability to self-assess accurately comes from interpreting normative data presented in the KrugerDunning type graphical format or closely related (y - x) vs. (x) graphical conventions. Our data show that
peoples' self-assessments of competence, in general, reflect a genuine competence that they can
demonstrate. That finding contradicts the current consensus about the nature of self-assessment. Our
results further confirm that experts are more proficient in self-assessing their abilities than novices and
that women, in general, self-assess more accurately than men. The validity of interpretations of data
depends strongly upon how carefully the researchers consider the numeracy that underlies graphical
presentations and conclusions. Our results indicate that carefully measured self-assessments provide
valid, measurable and valuable information about proficiency.
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Introduction
Measuring whether or not people are good judges of their abilities rests largely on
numbers that result from simple arithmetic, namely subtraction. To quantify our
abilities to self-assess accurately, we select a challenge, provide an estimate of our
self-assessed ability to meet that challenge, and complete a direct measure of our
competence in engaging the challenge. Obtaining our self-assessment accuracy
requires nothing more than computing the difference between the two measures.
While the computation could scarcely be simpler, the simplicity belies a
surprisingly complex numeracy required to derive meaning from these numbers.
Demands for numeracy arise at every step of self-assessment research. Such
numeracy enlists number sense, reading and interpreting graphs, basic probability
and statistics, and reasoning. These concepts are emphasized on the Quantitative
Literacy Reasoning Assessment (Gaze et al. 2014). The steps themselves include
recognizing the assumptions involved in the paired measurements, preparing the
data for analyses, presenting the data graphically, interpreting the patterns that the
data produce on graphs, and deducing what these results reveal about our
collective abilities to self-assess. Within these steps, inattention to numeracy
produces (a) measures of undocumented reliability, (b) paired measures from
poorly aligned instruments, (c) data from studies of insufficient size to achieve
reliability or reproducibility, (d) data produced from vague questions, (e) failures
to recognize ceiling and floor effects in paired data and (f) mistaking graphical
patterns of random noise for patterns that depict the self-assessment signal
(Nuhfer et al. 2016a).
This paper is our second in Numeracy that addresses the challenges of
quantifying self-assessment. In our first paper (Nuhfer et al. 2016a), we focused
on insights produced by considering self-assessment data as mixtures of signal
and noise. The self-assessment signal manifests as a valid relationship between
self-assessed ratings of competence and direct measures of competence, but the
presence of noise interferes with detection of the sought-after signal, much as
static interferes with clear radio reception.
Three competing hypotheses about self-assessment follow from that first
paper. Proponents of the first hypothesis indeed do argue that measures of selfassessment yield meaningless nonsense.
1. No meaningful relationship exists between self-assessed competence and demonstrable
competence. Self-assessed competence is mostly random noise. (Porter 2012, 2013).

This first hypothesis is arguably a null hypothesis to our second and third
hypotheses, which are:
2. The relationship between self-assessed competence and demonstrable competence is
meaningful and measurable. Studies confirm that people have a strong propensity toward
overestimating their abilities. Those least competent have the greatest overconfidence in
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their actual abilities. Those most competent tend toward accuracy or slight
underconfidence in estimating their actual abilities. (Representative sources are Kruger
and Dunning 1999; Kennedy et al. 2002; Ehrlinger et al. 2008; Stinson and Xiaofeng
2008; Bell and Volckmann 2011; Pazicni and Bauer 2013)
3. The relationship between self-assessed competence and demonstrable competence is
meaningful and measurable. Some people exhibit significant overconfidence or
underconfidence, but overall, people's self-assessed competence is in accord with a
competence that they can demonstrate. (Ackerman, Beier and Bowen 2002; Nuhfer and
Knipp 2006; Favazzo, Willford and Watson 2014; Handel and Fritzsche 2016; Nuhfer et
al. 2016a; this paper)

In Nuhfer et al. (2016a), we ascertained that obtaining good measures of selfassessment ability requires great care. Studies done without such care produce
questionable results, and such results, when published, contribute to beliefs that
self-assessment is a nebulous human quality. After working to attend to the
numeracy issues outlined above, we generated a dataset from which we could
easily distinguish the numerical character of self-assessment measures from the
character of randomness. Our results (Nuhfer et al. 2016a) required us to reject
the first (null) hypothesis that consigned self-assessment to random noise.
In this paper, we determine which one of the remaining two hypotheses best
explains human self-assessment. The prevalent consensus in the peer-reviewed
literature supports the second of the three hypotheses. We trace the origins of this
consensus to the seminal paper of Kruger and Dunning (1999), and we explain in
this paper how eighteen years of replicating the procedures introduced in the
founding paper have produced the prevalent consensus. Our study, however,
shows merit in using alternative procedures, which, we have found, produce
results that contradict the established consensus about the nature of human selfassessment.
To convey how attention to numeracy might eliminate misconceptions about
self-assessment requires providing detailed explanations supported by examples.
To offer a more concise report in this (“main”) paper, we provide the explanations
with examples in Appendix A. The omission of such explanations in earlier
papers may account for the prolonged duration of misconceptions about selfassessment. To allow others to test our procedures and conclusions, we also share
our dataset in a separate appendix (B). It augments the dataset shared in our first
paper with some additional demographic information that we reserved for our
completion of this study.
In this study, we are not so much disputing behavioral scientists' conclusions
about the nature of self-assessment as we are questioning the numeracy that
underlies these conclusions. Indeed, our greatest concern in questioning the
numeracy is that readers might see our work as intentionally detracting from the
pioneering contribution that Kruger and Dunning (1999) made to behavioral
science. We note, however, that Kruger and Dunning (1999, p. 1132) clearly
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anticipated the difficulties inherent in the area of study that they opened:
Although we feel we have done a competent job in making a strong case for this analysis,
studying it empirically, and drawing out relevant implications, our thesis leaves us with
one haunting worry that we cannot vanquish. That worry is that this article may contain
faulty logic, methodological errors, or poor communication.

Our navigating the numeracy of self-assessment measures revealed a path
replete with unanticipated pitfalls and barriers. The trepidation that Kruger and
Dunning expressed in 1999 remains shared by us in 2017. Yet, if our work
confirms that earlier conclusions have less support from quantitative reasoning
than investigators recognized, then justification exists for reevaluation of the
consensus established from nearly two decades of self-assessment literature.
To provide continuity with our earlier paper, we employ the same dataset that
we collected for Nuhfer et al. (2016a). Because we provided the methods section
for collecting this data in the first paper, we do not repeat it here. Each of the
1154 participants in our study produced a measure of demonstrated competence in
science literacy from his/her score on the Science Literacy Concept Inventory
(SLCI, reliability R = .84) and a self-assessed competency rating to address this
challenge through a knowledge survey of the Inventory (KSSLCI, R = .93). Both
instruments furnish data that contain signal mixed with noise. We verified that the
data had sufficient reliability to allow us to extract clear expressions of the signal
from the noise (Nuhfer et al. 2016a).
We proceed next to clarify why measuring metacognitive self-assessment is
worth the effort; distinguish between the several kinds of metacognitive selfassessments currently addressed by researchers; and visit considerations of what
we are actually measuring. After that, we assess the influential Kruger-Dunning
graphical presentation of self-assessment data and explain why we believe that
future studies must employ alternative approaches.

Background
Why Measure Metacognitive Self-Assessment?
“Metacognition refers to one's knowledge concerning one's own cognitive
processes or anything related to them…” (Flavell 1976, p.232). A primary aim of
higher education is to produce graduates with abilities to increase their capacity
for effective learning and thinking throughout their lives. Developing students'
metacognitive self-assessment skills may be key to producing such graduates.
Self-assessment is a metacognitive skill that includes the capacity to assess
accurately one's own ability to meet immediate cognitive and social challenges
with present skills and knowledge. The exercise of self-assessment is more
intuitive than analytical and occurs by accessing one's affective feeling of capacity
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to meet the challenge.
Summaries of the history that have led to confirming the value of
metacognition (Dunlosky and Metcalfe 2009) and the affective domain (Damasio
1999) reveal earlier periods during which behavioral scientists disrespected the
two topics and regarded each as unworthy of serious study. Research eventually
established both as important to learning. Self-assessment, however, which draws
from metacognition and affect, remains viewed with suspicion. We concur with
the observation of Zell and Krizan (2014) that continued disagreement still exists
about whether people, in general, perceive their skills accurately or inaccurately.
Kruger and Dunning (1999) presented the first serious effort to quantify the
accuracy of peoples’ self-assessment. They concluded that relatively unskilled
people suffer illusory superiority and mistakenly assess their abilities to be much
higher than they are. Conversely, persons who demonstrate high ability accurately
or modestly underestimate their competence.
Subsequent studies replicated Kruger and Dunning's results, and in less than a
decade, many accepted that their results applied to the general populace, as
typified by the following statement.
People are typically overly optimistic when evaluating the quality of their performance
on social and intellectual tasks. In particular, poor performers grossly overestimate their
performances because their incompetence deprives them of the skills needed to recognize
their deficits (Ehrlinger et al. 2008, p. 98).

A Web search for “Dunning-Kruger Effect” reveals that Kruger's and
Dunning's discovery reached the lay populace where it engendered beliefs that
people were mostly incapable of accurate self-assessment. At least one scholar
went so far as to proclaim measures of self-assessed learning as meaningless noise
(Porter, 2012; 2013). We note here that deprecating the value of self-assessment
conflicts with the views expressed by Kruger and Dunning (1999) who
recognized the value of self-assessment skill and documented that instruction
could improve it.
Other workers furnished results that emphatically assigned value to
metacognitive self-assessment. Ertmer and Newby (1996, p. 1) studied the
characteristics of expert learners and listed these as “strategic, self-regulated, and
reflective.” All three characteristics have metacognitive qualities that we now
recognize incorporate self-assessment. They further noted that expert learners use
specific strategy “to deliberately select, control, and monitor strategies needed to
achieve desired learning goals.”
Isaacson and Fujita (2006, p. 39) confirmed the value of self-assessment
when they deduced that the most successful college students possess
metacognitive skills. Highly successful students were “more accurate at predicting
their test results; more realistic in their goals; more likely to adjust their
confidence in-line with their test results....” Dunlosky and Rawson (2012) offered
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related evidence that linked students overconfidence to their underachievement.
Current researchers (Wittmann et al. 2016) identify specific areas of the brain
activated during self-assessment, and they credit self-assessment to originating as
one of the important human survival skills.
McMillan and Hearn (2008, p. 40) may be two of the strongest proponents
for the educational value of developing students’ ability to accurately self-assess:
In the current era of standards-based education, student self-assessment stands alone in its
promise of improved student motivation and engagement and learning. Correctly
implemented, student self-assessment can promote intrinsic motivation, internally
controlled effort, a mastery goal orientation, and more meaningful learning. Its powerful
impact on student performance—in both classroom assessments and large-scale
accountability assessments—empowers students to guide their own learning and
internalize the criteria for judging success.

In summary, college instructors should measure self-assessment because the
skill is valuable, measurable and teachable. Gaining self-assessment skill seems to
increase the capacity for improved learning, problem-solving and decisionmaking. Improvement of students' self-assessment skill could be a universal
educational outcome that transcends all disciplines.

Kinds of Self-Assessment
Scholars identify several kinds of self-assessment. Kruger and Dunning's (1999)
seminal paper addressed participants' predicted ability to meet a cognitive
challenge before confronting it. Scholars also refer to predicted abilities as “firstorder judgments” (Dunlosky, Serra, Matvey and Rawson 2005). Kruger and
Dunning (1999) also addressed results from a second kind of self-assessment
subsequently termed “postdicted performance judgment” (Händel and Fritzsche
2016). In postdicted self-assessments, each participant expresses a summative
estimate of how successfully she/he has addressed a recently completed cognitive
challenge.
Kruger and Dunning, as well as later researchers, asked students to rate their
relative performance on a test as compared to other participants’ test scores.
These estimates demand that the participants rate, not just self-assessed
competence, but also the relative competence of others. There are conditions
under which the competence and performance of other participants are available
(Wittmann et al. 2016), but such was not the case in our study. In the absence of
substantial information about other participants, estimates of self-competence
relative to others seem based on little substance (see Hartwig and Dunlosky
2014). Self-assessed competence in the context of estimated comparisons with
competence demonstrated by others might be registering each individual’s
relative sense of self-esteem rather than self-assessed competence.
Related research literature recognizes additional kinds of self-assessment.
One is “meta-metacognition” or “second-order judgment.” Here, participants
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estimate the degree with which they have successfully provided an accurate selfevaluation of their performance to a cognitive challenge (Dunlosky, Serra,
Matvey and Rawson 2005; Buratti and Allwood 2012). Another type of selfassessment described in some related literature is “metacomprehension”
(Dunlosky and Lipko 2007), a term primarily employed in studies of reading skill.
It refers to metacognitive awareness of readers about their learning and
understanding produced while accessing text materials.
Self-assessment queries take global and granular forms. Global queries are
singular statements that are broad and general. An example asks participants to
rate their degree of competency in a broad conceptual area such as humor, critical
thinking, writing or science in response to a query similar to “I understand…
(humor, science, etc.).” Kruger and Dunning's original paper employed global
queries, and so did most of the self-assessment studies such as Ehrlinger et al.
(2008) and Pazicni and Bauer (2013) that subsequently built on Kruger and
Dunning's work.
Granular self-assessment instruments employ a battery of specific items, all
of which map to a broad conceptual area. Knowledge surveys (Nuhfer and Knipp
2003; Bell and Volckmann 2011; Favazzo et al. 2014; Nuhfer et al. 2016a), which
ask respondents to estimate their ability to address many specific cognitive or skill
challenges, constitute granular assessments. For example, the composite rating
derived from all 25 items of the knowledge survey (KSSLCI) provides a granular
self-assessment of the degree to which a participant understands science’s way of
knowing (Nuhfer 2015). As another example, about 200 items on a course-based
knowledge survey might map to the general understanding of psychology or
geology as provided by an introductory college course (Nuhfer et al. 2010).
Some workers treat self-assessments derived from global and granular
queries as equivalent (Bell and Volckmann 2011). Our study participants
furnished a total of four separate self-assessment ratings as registered by three
global questions and the granular KSSLCI. When we compared global and
granular self-assessments that addressed the same cognitive construct, our study
revealed that some global queries could yield a different kind of self-assessment
from that provided by granular instruments (Nuhfer et al. 2016a, Table 1; this
paper, Appendix A, Fig. A1-6).
In this paper, we address predicted self-assessment and touch briefly on
postdicted self-assessment. We do not address second-order-type judgments,
metacomprehension, or any self-assessments that request that participants
estimate their ability to address a challenge relative to others' abilities.

What Are We Measuring?
Since 1999, studies of self-assessment accuracy have typically employed two
measures expressed as percentages or percentiles bounded by 0 and 100. One
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quantifies cognitive competence as expressed by a test score. The other manifests
in responding to “I can… (do the specified challenge)… now, with my present
knowledge and skills.” Such responses express affective feelings. Such feelings
can range from well informed to completely uninformed by cognitive knowledge
and relevant experiences (Caputo and Dunning 2005).
By an informally accepted convention, researchers quantify self-assessment
accuracy by subtracting the demonstrated competency score from the selfassessed competency rating. We follow that convention. By expressing both
measures as percentages, the differences between paired measures register in
percentage points (ppts). In our studies, we used the knowledge survey (KSSLCI)
matched to the Concept Inventory (SLCI) to calculate accuracy:
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓– 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒.
By this procedure, perfect self-assessed accuracy is 0. Increasingly positive values
denote increasing overconfidence. Increasingly negative values denote increasing
underconfidence.
The act of computing self-assessment accuracy by subtraction assumes that
we are calculating the difference between two measures with like qualities. Such
subtractions begin to question the nature of distinctions often made between the
cognitive and affective domains of thought and learning. We could view selfassessment accuracy as subtracting a direct score on a test of cognitive
understanding from a quantified rating of affective feelings. We initially
questioned what the remainder generated by subtracting a measure of competence
from a measure of confidence expressed and whether the computation was
justifiable.
Given the nature of our study, we opted to consider the calculation as
justified by considering both measures as addressing the same competence in a
well-defined area, one as a measurement and the other as an estimate. Our selfassessment instrument (KSSLCI) furnishes the estimate. It addresses the same
construct as the cognitive competency measure (SLCI) because the 25 challenges
employed in both are identical. The two instruments generate similar numerical
results in percentage points for each of these challenges (Nuhfer et al. 2016a, Fig.
10; Nuhfer 2015, Fig. 1). Of course, one could argue the nature of such estimates
as cognitive, affective or a combination of both.
Support for considering these as both comes from recognizing affective
confidence and cognitive competence as two properties produced by multiple
regions of the brain, which contribute cognitive and affective components to a
common thought (Phan et al. 2004). If true, then it seems impractical to
distinguish two properties of the same thought with separate units, such as we
might do for the distinctly different physical properties of a physical object. Still,
to invoke this justification for the subtraction requires two well-aligned
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instruments. Studies that employ non-identical challenges or different constructs
for queries of the confidence and competence measures risk computing selfassessment accuracy from subtracting two nonequivalent measures. Doing so
offers an unsound basis for further interpretations or conclusions.
If separate units were viable, we might be able to quantify self-assessment
through ratios of confidence-to-competence instead of through difference. In our
early research, we experimented with trying to use ratios. However, measures of
both expressed as percentages rendered the use of ratios impractical.
We turn next to examining how researchers' embracing of a common
graphical convention may have produced the current consensus about the nature
of self-assessment.

Influence of the Kruger-Dunning Graphical Convention
The numeracy associated with the Kruger-Dunning graphical convention (Fig. 1)
is fundamental to understanding the prevalent consensus views about the nature of
self-assessment. This convention constitutes the most influential graphic in the
self-assessment literature, and many researchers from Kruger and Dunning (1999)
through present (e.g., Miller and Geraci 2011; Handel and Fritzsche 2016) have
employed it to portray their results and substantiate their conclusions.

Figure 1. Self-assessment data rendered in the Kruger-Dunning graphical convention.
The figure shows self-assessed competence compared with measured competence from
two studies with two of the largest databases currently registered in the self-assessment
literature. A, which is redrawn from Pazicni and Bauer (2013, Fig. 1), displays
performance on a mid-term chemistry test and perceived performance obtained from a
single global postdicted self-assessed rating of performance on the test. B displays
actual competence as measured by performance on the 25-item Science Literacy
Concept Inventory (SLCI) and anticipated performance computed as the average of
self-assessment ratings from the 25-item knowledge survey of the Inventory
(KSSLCI). The datasets employed for A and B both contain a strong self-assessment
signal as shown by the steeply inclined perceived performance and KSSLCI rating
lines (see Appendix A Fig. A1-6 and Nuhfer et al. 2016a, Fig. 5).
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The published graphics consistently display the X-shaped patterns that show
unskilled people as self-assessing their abilities to be much higher than they are.
(See bottom quartiles in Fig. 1A and B.) This replication across many studies
certainly provided confidence in the prevalent view that affirms a tendency for
people who lack skill to overestimate their abilities.
The patterns usually show members of the top quartile as more accurately
assessing their actual abilities, and tending toward underestimating their actual
performance. Certainly, it is logical to expect that those with expertise in an area
are in a much better position to accurately self-assess their abilities in that area
than are those with little or no expertise. However, we raise two questions.
(1) Do the data depicted through the Kruger-Dunning convention offer
sufficient quantitative evidence for confirming the expectation?
Our answer to this first question is “no.” Our study caused us to realize that
the Kruger-Dunning graph offers insufficient information needed for
characterizing human self-assessment. Since 1999, assumptions based on
interpretations made from that graph’s characteristic patterns exemplified in
Figure 1 have led to the current consensus view. We justify this “no” answer in
detail in Appendix A, Part 1, where we address the following six overlooked
aspects of numeracy on which such interpretations rest.
1.

Random noise can generate X-shaped patterns in Kruger-Dunning-type graphs, and
researchers can easily misinterpret these patterns as meaningful measures of selfassessment.

2.

The Kruger-Dunning type graphs present patterns that appear meaningful from
datasets too small to offer reliability.

3.

In (𝑦 − 𝑥) vs. (x) graphs, Sets of (x) and (y), both bounded by 0 and 100, generate
strong ceiling and floor effects that researchers easily misinterpret as meaningful
measures of self-assessment (addressed in Nuhfer et al. 2016a, Figures 7, 8 and 9).

4.

Sorting data pairs by one member of the pair invariably produces the “X-shaped”
pattern of Kruger-Dunning graphs and, sorting data by percentile rank renders all
expressions of performance as norm-referenced rather than criterion-based.

5.

Kruger-Dunning graphs cannot show the distributions of varied self-assessment skills
in a populace.

6.

Kruger-Dunning graphs fail to reveal the degree of correlation that exists between
self-assessed competence and demonstrated competence on a participant-byparticipant basis.

Artifact patterns generated by noise are particularly troublesome because they
mimic those that researchers might reasonably expect as patterns produced from
the self-assessment signal. This similarity of patterns generated by artifacts and
expectations invites attributing the graphical patterns that random noise produces
as patterns that describe the character of human self-assessment.
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(2) Do the data in total from all studies best support the second or the third of
the three hypotheses that we listed above?
Scholars established the prevalent view, which supports the second
hypothesis, by interpreting patterns depicted by the Kruger-Dunning-type graph.
If our data represented in Figure 1B followed the same conventional
interpretation, then our study would also support the second hypothesis. However,
we proceed next to explain why we portray and interpret our data differently. We
will show how an analysis based on careful considerations of numeracy better
supports the third hypothesis.

Results
Results from Categorical Data: Comparing Experts with
Novices
The consensus that favors the second hypothesis rests upon the process of sorting
participants’ data by demonstrated competency scores in ascending order and
constructing interpretations from a Kruger-Dunning-type graph like Figure 1. This
approach is analogous to the norm-referenced practice of “grading on a curve,”
wherein participants gain access into the top quartile by being relatively more
proficient than members of the lower quartiles.
This section describes a different approach. Here, we present a criterionreferenced study based on categories defined by qualifications of expertise to
meet a cognitive challenge. The value of such an approach lies in avoiding
reliance on numerically sorted data and gaining a way to study the degree to
which the self-assessment characteristics of members of the top and bottom
quartiles defined by norm-referenced scoring reflect the criterion-referenced
characteristics that typify experts and novices.
Our categories consist of qualified novices (lower-division undergraduates),
developing experts (upper-division undergraduates and graduate students) and
experts with significant qualifications (professors). The SLCI measures cognitive
competence in the ability to recognize and understand science as an evidencebased way of knowing, and knowing factual content did not advantage
participants in this particular challenge (Nuhfer et al. 2016b). Our experts in this
study became qualified as such through achieving advanced degrees that required
demonstrable evidence-based reasoning. The mean competence values (SLCI
score averages) calculated for each category of academic rank confirm highly
significant differences in demonstrated competence between novices and experts
(Appendix Part 2, Fig. A1-7).
The graphical convention employed in this section to display the categorical
data (Fig. 2) offers more information than a Kruger-Dunning graph like Figure
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1B. Figure 2 shows the confidence intervals of the means of each category, the
significance of differences between these means, and the spread or range of
variance of participants within each category. The different results that come from
graphing unsorted categorical data (Fig. 2) and sorted data (Fig. 1B) account for
the two graphical conventions offering a basis for two contradictory
interpretations. Opting to present the data as percentiles (Fig. 2) or as raw scores
in percentages (Fig. 3) further complicates the interpretations. Researchers
employ Kruger-Dunning-type graphs that present data as either percentages or
percentiles to render interpretations (see Ehrlinger et al. 2008 for examples), but
the use of percentiles is prevalent.
The figures that display categorical data (Figs. 2, 3 and 5) have dimensionless
abscissas that simply plot the (𝑦 − 𝑥) scores by categories. This yields a graph of
the form (𝑦 − 𝑥) vs. categories. The norm-referenced data aggregated by quartiles
appears in Figures A1-2, A1-3, and A1-5 in the Appendix. These latter figures
have scaled abscissas that display increasing SLCI scores, which places these
graphs in the category of (𝑦 − 𝑥) vs. (x) formats that we noted (Nuhfer et al. 2016a)
as particularly troublesome because they generate severe ceiling effects.
The prevalent consensus in the self-assessment literature asserts that the
people who are most lacking in competence are those who most severely
overestimate their abilities, whereas people who possess the greatest competence
are more accurate in their estimates and usually tend to underestimate their
competence by modest amounts. Researchers (typified by Burson, Larrick and
Klayman 2006; Ehrlinger et al. 2008; Bell and Volckmann 2011; Pazicni and
Bauer 2013) corroborate that assertion through displaying their data in the
Kruger-Dunning type graphs.
From the patterns presented in Kruger-Dunning-type graphs (Fig. 1) and the
prevalent consensus derived from such graphs, we expected that the average selfassessments of confirmed novices would exhibit a pronounced overestimation of
abilities and be less accurate as a whole than the average self-assessment of
confirmed experts. However, the mean self-assessment accuracies (as registered
by 𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) differ little across the categories of academic
rank (Figs. 2 and 3). Figure 2 shows the mean estimates of all academic ranks as
plotting close to the perfect self-assessment value of 𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 −
𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 0. In this graphical presentation, experts even appeared less
accurate in their collective self-assessments than did novices (Fig. 2), although
this appearance could be a product of some floor and ceiling effects, as discussed
further below.
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Figure 2. Categorical self-assessment accuracies plotted as percentiles. The abscissa is
dimensionless and simply displays self-assessment accuracies by academic rank. Black dots
show the respondents' distributions of accuracy expressed in percentile-rank differences in each
academic rank. The height of the green diamonds reflects the bounds of the 99% confidence
level of the mean; width of diamonds reflects the numbers in each rank category. Box to the
right depicts the significant differences between ranks as expressed by t-testing. Diameters of
the circles are the bounds of the 99% confidence interval. Separation of circles shows that the
means of professors and the means of graduate students differ significantly from those of
undergraduates. Overlapping of circles reflects a lack of significant differences between
undergraduate ranks. Graph produced by SAS Institute's JMP 11.2 software.

In Figures 2 and 3, the data points plotted for each category reveal that
members of each academic rank tend to overestimate and underestimate with
similar frequency. This accounts for the category means of (𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 −
𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) all being close to zero. In Figure 1, the members of each quartile
also overestimate and underestimate with about the same frequency (see
Appendix Fig. A1-2 for supporting evidence), but the clustering of all of the
lowest scores in the bottom quartile dictates that the probability for larger
magnitudes of over-assessment are greater for members of the bottom quartile.
For those in the top quartile, the probability for larger magnitudes of underassessment is greater. Thus, the calculated mean self-assessment inaccuracies are
highest in the bottom quartile and lowest in the top quartile, but that’s because of
the probability situation and not because of a quality inherent to human selfassessment. This situation produces the ceiling and floor effects mentioned above
(described in more detail in Nuhfer et al. 2016a) and in the Appendix of this
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paper. These findings show that the means of the quartiles are not useful for
distinguishing human self-assessment abilities.

Figure 3. Degrees of self-assessment accuracy plotted as percentage points. The
abscissa is dimensionless and simply displays self-assessment accuracies by academic
rank. The black dots show the distributions of responses in ppts in each rank. The
height of the green diamonds reflects the bounds of the 99% confidence level of the
mean; width of diamonds reflects the numbers in each rank category. Panel to the
right depicts the significant differences between ranks as expressed by t-testing.
Diameters of the circles in the right-hand panel are the bounds of the 99% confidence
interval. Overlapping of these circles reflects a lack of significant differences between
means. Graph produced by SAS Institute's JMP 11.2 software.

The means of the different categories likewise seem unsuitable for
distinguishing differences in self-assessment skills between categories (Fig. 3).
On average, novices (N = 448) overestimated their competence on the SLCI by
2.1 ppts, and experts (N = 69) underestimated theirs by 2.4 ppts. The influence of
ceiling and floor effects could contribute to these small differences. Although the
presence of such effects does not completely rule out the possibility of tendencies
for novices to overestimate and experts to underestimate, our particular dataset
indicates that such tendencies, if they exist, are weak.
The compositions of the bottom and top quartiles in Figure1B do reflect a
systematic distribution of novices and experts. In Figure 1B, the bottom quartile
contains 61.3% novices, 38.7% developing experts, and 0% experts. In contrast,
the top quartile contains 17.4% novices, 64.8% developing experts, and 17.8%
experts. Of those in the expert category (professors), 74% of them ended up in the
top quartile, whereas only 11% of novices reached the top quartile.
Whereas Figure 1B indicates clear differences in mean self-assessment
accuracies between low competence and high-competence quartiles, Figure 2
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indicates lesser, marginally significant differences in mean self-assessment
accuracies between novices and experts. With the data expressed simply as raw
percentage points (Fig. 3), these differences become smaller still and lose
significance.
Both Figures 2 and 3 are technically (𝑦 − 𝑥) vs. (categories) type instead of
the (𝑦 − 𝑥) vs. (x) type graphs that we (Nuhfer et al. 2016a) showed as significant
generators of ceiling effects. However, Figures 2 and 3 may carry some ceiling
and floor effects (although less so than those shown in (𝑦 − 𝑥) vs. (x) type graphs)
because the high scores achieved by participants in the expert category
(professors in Figs. 2 and 3) leave a limited potential for overestimation.
Figure 3 allows us to begin to see a difference between experts and novices in
the vertical spreads (variances) of the data points furnished by the populations
within each category. The spreads are less evident in Figure 2 because converting
raw scores into percentiles orders the data, and this ordering redistributes any
skewed distributions of scores toward normal distributions (Fig. 4).
Figure 4 provides detailed comparisons of the spreads by rank when
expressing the data either as percentiles (Fig. 2) or as percentage points (Fig. 3).
The graphing as percentage points discloses that experts exhibit smaller spreads in
their scores than do novices, and experts' self-assessment accuracies cluster more
tightly around perfect self-assessment (Fig. 4).
In our first paper, we showed the importance of recognizing the patterns of
randomness in various graphical formats (Nuhfer et al. 2016a). Here, Figure 5
displays the pattern of randomness across the categories as rendered by the
graphical convention that produced Figures 2 and 3 from actual measurements.
The number of participants in each rank in Figure 3 determined the size of the
random number array that we employed to simulate each rank in Figure 5.
Figure 5, like its real data counterpart (Fig. 3), displays all ranks as having
mean self-assessment accuracies close to that of the perfect self-assessment score
of 0, with no significant differences in means between ranks. In our actual data
(Figs. 2 and 3) and simulated data (Fig. 5), members of all categories tend to
overestimate and underestimate to about the same degree. This tendency produces
mean self-assessed competencies across all academic ranks at close to the perfect
self-assessment value of zero.
Whereas the categories' mean accuracies are all close to zero in Figure 5, the
sorting of random number data by competence scores and aggregating it into
quartiles produces quartiles whose mean (KSSLCI rating - SLCI score) values
differ greatly and systematically from one another. The comparisons of Figures 5
and Appendix Figure A1-5 show the power of random noise to influence the
graphical patterns produced by sorted data. The convention employed in Figures
A1-2, A1-3 and A1-5 and the Kruger-Dunning-type convention both yield
patterns that are particularly prone to the influences of noise and sorting.
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Figure 4. Distributions of participants within each academic rank as expressed in
percentiles from Figure 2 and as percentage points from Figure 3. Left column details
the spreads in Figure 2; right column details the spreads in Figures 3. Raw data in
percentage points shows a general tightening of spreads from novice to experts,
whereas data normalized when expressed as percentiles obscure this trend. The
category of graduate students contains too few participants to yield a good
representation and contains a much higher percentage of non-science majors than do
the other categories. Appendix A Part 3 further details how good data does reveal
ways to distinguish differences between experts and novices in self-assessment skills.
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Figure 5. Random number simulation of self-assessment accuracy and the distributions
of responses by academic rank. The height of the green diamonds reflects the bounds of
the 99% confidence level; width of the diamonds reflects the numbers in each rank
category. Diameters of the circles in the right panel are the bounds of the 99% confidence
interval. Overlapping of circles reflects no significant differences between means by ttesting. This pattern produced by the aggregation of data by categories differs greatly
from the pattern yielded by a similar simulation of sorted data aggregated by quartiles
(see Appendix Fig. A1-5). Graph generated using SAS Institute's JMP 11.2 software.

As we noted in Nuhfer et al. (2016a), the graphical convention that seems
least troublesome for a straightforward presentation of self-assessment data is the
(𝑦) vs. (𝑥) scatter plot with a line fit. We show our comparisons between experts
and novices through this convention in Figure 6.
Taken alone, correlation coefficients of self-assessed competence versus
demonstrated competence revealed little difference between experts and novices
(Fig. 6). Both r-values are highly significant at p <.0001 but not much different
from each other or from the correlation established from the entire population
studied (r = .60; N = 1154; Nuhfer et al. 2016a). This substantiates the assertion
of Ackerman and Wolman (2007, p. 58):
Thus, although the mean correlations between self-estimates of ability and objective
ability measures are modest in magnitude, it appears that substantial gains in
correspondence can be obtained when specific measurement conditions are met.

The significant positive correlations indicate that people as a whole, whether
experts or novices, tend to self-assess their competence to the degree that is
generally correct. We stress that the ability to perceive this relationship rests in

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/numeracy/vol10/iss1/art4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1936-4660.10.1.4

16

Nuhfer et al.: How Noise and a Graphic Subverted Understanding Self-Assessment

collecting a critical mass of reliable data from instruments that are well aligned
(Nuhfer 2015; Nuhfer et al. 2016a).

Figure 6. Comparisons of correlations between experts (A) and novices (B) in our study
populace. Correlation coefficients are surprisingly similar.

In summary, our results show that a few novices tend to score as highly as
experts on tests of competence (SLCI). Those who do will end up in the top
quartile together with most of the experts in a norm-referenced study. However,
experts’ self-assessments show less variation than those of novices and are more
consistently closer to perfect accuracy than are those of novices. Because novices
do differ from experts in both competency and self-assessment accuracy, the top
quartile in a norm-referenced study is not synonymous with the expert category in
a criterion-referenced study. The categorical criterion-referenced study detailed
here appeared to provide better information about the characteristics of selfassessment than did the norm-referenced study detailed in the Appendix.

Results from Demographic Data
In our study, we looked at other demographic data beyond class rank. We
conclude this section by summarizing our findings in the groups of students with
respect to 1) English as a first language; 2) status as a first generation student; 3)
status as a science major or expressed interest to major in science and 4) gender.
Nuhfer et al. (2016b) reported the results of the demonstrated competency (SLCI
scores) from over 17,000 undergraduate students across these same four
categories. The study verified significant differences in mean competence at the
99.9% confidence levels within the first three categories and no significant
difference between men and women.
Here, we focus solely on the self-assessment characteristics of our
undergraduate participants, which consist of 664 women and 371 men distributed
as 213 freshmen, 235 sophomores, 267 juniors and 326 seniors. This population
had the demographic distributions of 432 (41.5%) first-generation students, 712
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(68.4%) students majoring in or considering majoring in science, and 162 (15.6%)
students whose native language was not English.
Table 1.
Four Mean Self-Assessed Competency Rating Measures and One Demonstrated
Competency Score Measure by Demographic Category*
PREKSSLCI
GLOBAL
Rating
(%)

KSSLCI
Rating
(%)

POSTKSSLCI
GLOBAL
Rating
(%)

SLCI
Score
(%)

**GLOBAL
POST-SLCI
Rating (%)

MEAN
(KSSLCISLCI)
(ppts)

77.1%
72.0%

77.7%
68.6%

76.7%
67.1%

75.2%
68.0%

78.9%
70.1%

2.5
0.6

71.0%
76.8%

63.9%
78.6%

65.8%
76.0%

63.9%
76.1%

64.7%
77.0%

0.0
2.5

70.1%
75.9%

61.7%
76.1%

61.9%
74.7%

63.5%
73.8%

66.4%
76.5%

-1.8
2.3

72.9%
78.9%

70.3%
80.3%

69.4%
78.6%

70.6%
75.4%

71.6%
80.3%

-0.3
5.0

First Generation
Student?
No (n = 603)
Yes (n = 432)
Science major
Commitment?
No (n = 329)
Yes (n = 712)
English as First
Language?
No (n = 160)
Yes (n = 879)
Gender
Women (n = 664)
Men (n = 371)

* Mean ratings and scores (in percent) from different self-assessment measures employed in the self-assessment
studies reported by demographic categories. The differences within every category are significant at or above the
95% confidence level. We express self-assessment accuracy as the difference (𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 − 𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼) calculated as the
means of all students in each category. Perfect accuracy is expressed by 𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 − 𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 = 0.
**Our adding the Post-SLCI Global self-assessment query later in the study caused us to collect fewer responses.

Table 1 displays the results of measures across the different demographic
categories in the order in which the participants responded to the four selfassessed competency ratings that follow.
1. Pre-KSSLCI Global Rating: “A multiple choice test has been designed to measure how
well citizens understand the thinking process that scientists employ to understand the
physical world. The test is not timed and can be done online in any setting. The test does
not depend upon factual recall of knowledge. Any factual information needed or meanings
of any technical terms used are provided within the test itself. Based on your feelings of
self-assessment at this time, what is the score in percent (Write as % an estimate between
0% and 100%) that you believe that you would obtain if you took such a test?"
2. KSSLCI Knowledge Survey: This granular self-assessment value derives from the
cumulative rating in % derived from all 25 items in the KSSLCI.
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3. Post-KSSLCI Global: “Based only on your gut feelings established after taking this
knowledge survey, what score in percent (between 0% and 100%) do you think you would
obtain if you actually had to answer the twenty-five questions?”
4. Post-SLCI Global “Now that you have completed taking the Inventory, what score in
percent (between 0% and 100%) do you think you actually obtained?”

The first is a predicted self-assessment; the knowledge survey is a granular selfassessment, and the third and fourth items are postdicted global self-assessments.
See Appendix Figure A1-6 and its discussion for more details on the relationships
between these self-assessed competency ratings and the demonstrated competency
score relative to the Kruger-Dunning graphic.
Table 1 reveals a slight “reverse Dunning-Kruger Effect.” The groups who
are advantaged by having a major interest in science, a college-educated parent
and English as a native language do have higher mean competency scores (see
also Nuhfer et al. 2016b), but these advantaged subgroups tend toward being
slightly less accurate in self-assessment than their disadvantaged counterparts.
The differences between first-generation students and those who were not firstgeneration proved significant at only the 95% confidence level. The differences
exhibited in mean confidence ratings within all other demographic categories
were significant at the 99% confidence level.
One aberration in Table 1 was the finding of significant differences in the
SLCI scores between men and women in this dataset at the 99% level of
confidence. The larger 17,000-participant dataset that validated the SLCI (Nuhfer
et al. 2016b) confirmed that the SLCI is a gender-neutral instrument. That study
revealed that when the difference between men’s and women’s SLCI scores
proves significant in a population, the difference was not produced by an inherent
gender characteristic. Instead, the differences arose because of the unequal
distribution between genders of the socioeconomic factors that diminish the mean
scores on the SLCI. Socioeconomic factors that reduce mean SLCI scores of a
populace are (a) status as a first-generation student, (b) a low interest in majoring
in science, and (c) having English as a non-native language (see Nuhfer et al.
2016b).
In the dataset used for Table 1, the percentages of undergraduate women (N =
664) who are first-generation/nonscience-commitment/English-as-non-nativelanguage are 45.2%/35.5%/17.6%. By comparison, undergraduate men (N = 371)
in this dataset have only 35.0%/24.3%/11.3% membership in these respective
categories. These socioeconomic differences in the composition of each gender
populace substantially elevate the men’s mean score above the women’s mean
score in our studied population of undergraduates.
Although men and women do not significantly differ in their science literacy
competence as measured by the SLCI (Nuhfer et al. 2016b), men and women do
seem to differ significantly in mean self-assessment accuracy. In this study, the
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group mean of undergraduate women underestimated their performance by only
0.3 ppts. The group of undergraduate men overestimated their actual performance
by a mean of about 5 ppts (Table 1). This difference in means is highly significant
at the 99.9% level of confidence.
Kruger and Dunning (1999, p. 1123) considered gender differences in selfassessment skill and reported: “Gender failed to qualify any results in this or any
of the studies reported in this article….” However, subsequent studies (Hargittai
and Shafer 2006; Pazicni and Bauer 2013; Bolívar-Cruz, Verano-Tacoronte and
González-Betancor 2015) report gender differences in self-assessment abilities
that are consistent with ours. Our data showed that, on average, women selfassess their competence more accurately than do men. We consider the other
demographic differences listed in Table 1 as too small and tentative to try to
interpret, but the gender difference in self-assessment ability appears substantial.
Some scholars suggest that women's underconfidence in science (relative to
men's) may be discouraging women to major in science (Beyer, Rynes and Haller
2004; Cech, Rubineau, Silbey and Seron 2011), and they recommend taking
action to boost women's confidence to that of men's. However, those studies did
not consider self-assessment accuracy, and self-assessment accuracy probably has
more value than overconfidence. Men appear to be in greater need of training in
metacognitive self-assessment than women.

Summary of Results
Categorical data enables criterion-referenced examination of the nature of human
self-assessment in ways that normative-based analyses cannot. The means of
demonstrated competence (Appendix A Fig. A1-7) clearly do reflect the immense
differences between experts and novices. However, the means of self-assessment
accuracies clearly do not distinguish the self-assessment skills of novices from
experts (Figs. 2, 3 and 5). Correlations between self-assessed competence and
actual competence do not serve as a key to distinguish experts from novices (Fig.
6), but they indicate that people, in general, are more often correct than not in
estimating their competencies.
Kruger-Dunning-type graphs (Fig. 1) rely on sorted data for calculating the
means of self-assessed competence and demonstrated competence for each of the
competency quartiles. Researchers then use differences between the paired
measures displayed on graphical patterns to make conclusions about the selfassessment abilities of low-competence performers and high-competence
performers. These conclusions support the second hypothesis. Random noise
present in all self-assessment data, combined with ceiling and floor effects, also
offer graphical patterns anticipated by the second hypothesis. These latter patterns
have no origins in human behavior, but they seduce researchers into interpreting
them as such.
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The clearest distinction between the self-assessment skills of experts and
novices seems to lie in their different distributions of self-assessment accuracy
(Fig. 4), but the self-assessment literature rarely employs graphical conventions
that can display distributions. We next move to discuss ways in which researchers
might use the paired measures of self-assessed competence to illuminate the
nature of human self-assessment.

Discussion
Improving the Discourse about Self-Assessment Skill
Since 1999, showing the patterns from Kruger-Dunning-type graphics and related
(𝑦 − 𝑥) vs. (x) type graphs (Nuhfer et al. 2016a) remained the default for
communicating the nature of self-assessment. While the information this graphic
provides is both limited and probably distorted, such graphics remain a
cornerstone for statements such as “People are typically overly optimistic …,” and
“In particular, poor performers grossly overestimate…” (Ehrlinger et al. 2008, p.
98).
The grand mean SLCI score of our 1154 participants is 73.6%, and the grand
mean KSSLCI rating is 74.8%. Given the imperfect reliability of both
instruments, the apparent overconfidence of 1.2 ppts is too small to invoke as
support for any hypothesis that asserts that people have a marked propensity to
overestimate their abilities. Handel and Fritzsche (2016, p. 233) also found only a
slight overall inaccuracy in their studied populace but as a small underestimate
rather than an overestimate.
As established above in our discussion of Kruger-Dunning-type graphs, the
numeracy traditionally employed to support claims of gross overestimation seems
insufficient. Such graphs (Fig. 1 A and B) are incapable of imparting meaning to
discussions that employ descriptions such as “overly optimistic” or “grossly”
because such descriptors lack quantitative meaning. The self-assessment
literature’s neglect to furnish the language needed for better discourse furnishes a
barrier to the most basic discussions—even about “good” or “poor” selfassessment accuracy.
Supplying the minimal language needed to advance discourse requires
answering two essential, quantitative questions. The first question speaks to the
value of measuring self-assessment.
1. What magnitude of self-assessment error is permissible for a person who is “skilled” in
self-assessment?

To address this first question, we can look to the magnitudes of self-assessment
error that typify a population of experts. The second question directly addresses
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whether data obtained from a general populace better supports the second or the
third hypothesis.
2. What is the frequency of occurrence of varied degrees of self-assessment errors
(expressed as a percentage) across a large population?

For education, answering both questions enables discussion about acceptable
levels of self-assessment skill and achieving some consensus on when a level of
skill is so deficient as to merit efforts for remediation. To furnish the required
language, we employ the same data that produced Figure 1B to generate a
classification scale (Fig. 7A) that enables characterizing our study populace (Fig.
7B) with categories defined by quantitative bounds. Using our data in this way
addresses both questions.

Figure 7. A classification scale (A) and its application to our study populace (B). Magnitudes
of self-assessment inaccuracy (𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) expressed in percentage
points (ppts) define the classification categories (A) The frequencies of the occurrences of
these categories in our study population appear in B. The panels depict results by both tables
and graphics. The blue shaded area with dots in B expresses our recognizing (Nuhfer et al.
2016a) that random guessing by all participants could contribute up to about 18% within the
“good” range of ±10 ppts. The chances of guessing influencing the “Extreme” category are
very small.

As detailed in Nuhfer et al. (2016a) the limit imposed by the instrument that
yields the least reliable measures in paired data (in this case the SLCI's R of .84)
limits the strength of correlation possible between the measures. It also limits the
precision with which we can expect to define boundaries between the different
skill categories in Figure 7A. While the boundaries are set at convenient intervals
of 10 ppts, 20 ppts, etc., they are not arbitrary. The criterion-referenced
performance of known groups of experts and novices in our study populace
served to set these boundaries (see Appendix A, Part 3).
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We earlier defined “good self-assessment skill” as demonstrating selfassessed competency within ±10 percentage points (ppts) of demonstrated
proficiency, based on our discerning that over three-quarters of known experts
could self-assess at this level of proficiency (Nuhfer et al. 2016a, p 19). Of our
1154 participants who range from novices to experts, 615 or 48.5% of those
participants met the criteria for having good self-assessment skill (Fig. 7B). About
80% of experts self-assess within the bounds of ±15 ppts defined as “adequate
self-assessment skill.” This zone (Fig. 7A) accounts for 66.2% of our participants
who demonstrated adequate or better self-assessment skills (Fig. 7B).
The distinction between adequate and inadequate self-assessment is an
important one because scores that cross the boundary into “inadequate” can
trigger investments in remediation efforts. Given this initial effort at a proposed
classification scale and the realization that our instruments are reliable but
imperfect, we sought not to set a dogmatic boundary between the two. Instead, we
designated a ±5 ppt band between skilled and unskilled (between ±15 and ±20
ppts) self-assessments as “Marginal” (Fig. 7A). This choice allows users
flexibility to make an informed evaluation of the state of the self-assessment skills
of their own students.
Based on our work to date, we inform students that self-assessments in which
error exceeds ± 20 ppts can indicate a need for efforts at developing better selfassessment skill. Participants with marginal self-assessment skills constituted
10.5% of our study populace. Errors of overconfidence or underconfidence that
exceeded “marginal” (± 20 ppts) occurred in 23.3% of our participants. Of these
(Fig. 7A), 13% overestimated and 10.3% underestimated (Fig. 7B).
The extreme categories (defined by inaccuracy exceeding 30 ppts) constituted
only 10.8 % of our studied population (Fig. 7B). Less than half of them (5.3%)
were extremely overconfident and constituted a group that could merit the label
coined by Kruger and Dunning (1999), “unskilled and unaware of it.” Figure 8
details the distributions of our populace across the defined categories and adds
clarity to information conveyed by Figure 1B.
In histograms like Figure 8, random guessing has about one hundred times
the influence near the center of the histogram, where (𝐾𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 −
𝑆𝐿𝐶𝐼 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) is zero, than it has on the sides where self-assessments are
“Extreme” (see Nuhfer et al. 2016a, Fig. 13 for detailed explanation). If all 1154
participants were randomly guessing, that would have placed over 200 scores in
the “good” (blue) zone of Figure 8. Fortunately, the study of over 17,000 students
who took the SLCI (Nuhfer et al. 2016b, Fig. 1) shows that the numbers of
participants who engage in random guessing on the SLCI contributes much less
than 18% of “Good” ratings in Figure 8, and almost nothing in the “Extreme”
zones. While some guessing doubtless occurs in our dataset, its influence on our
Figures 7B and 8 appears minor.
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Figure 8. Distributions of the categories of self-assessment accuracy based on the differences in
percentage points (ppts) between scores received from 1154 participants who took the 25-item
Science Literacy Concept Inventory (SLCI) and their self-assessed ratings of competence in
understanding science as a way of knowing as registered by the 25-item knowledge survey of the
Inventory (KSSLCI). Standard deviation (sigma) = 18.4 ppts. Color codings of categories are the
same as in Figure 7 with "Extreme" inaccuracies covering the entire gray area.

In Appendix A, we explain our process for setting the boundaries in Figures 7
and 8 by using the standard deviations of self-assessment inaccuracies (KSSLCI
rating - SLCI score) deduced from the distributions produced by the population of
experts. The use of standard deviations alone rather than inaccuracy in ppts
provides a basis for an alternate classification scale. We chose to feature a scale
based on percentage points here because doing so offers immediate use to readers
who measure self-assessment accuracies of their students as percentages and have
neither a large enough dataset from which to create their own scale nor a
population of known experts with which to calibrate their measures.
To our knowledge, Figure 7 represents the first effort to construct a criterionreferenced self-assessment scale. We recognize that our self-assessment results
and categories defined in this first effort could be contextual to the topic that we
investigated, the instruments that we used, and the populace that we examined.
Future studies may alter the boundary cut-offs, but conversations about where the
boundaries might be better set cannot occur without establishing the language
needed to enable such discourse. In addition, our study allows others to use our
instruments as a convenient way to calibrate their populations' self-assessment
characteristics and to compare self-assessed abilities in their study populace as
measured by their instruments with ours.
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Implications for Teaching, Learning and Assessment
Self-assessment appears to be a teachable metacognitive skill (Kruger and
Dunning 1999) that is meaningful and measurable. It may be one of the most
beneficial skills of all for students to develop (Rivers 2001; Pintrich 2002).
The obvious way to promote skill in metacognitive self-assessment is to
design lessons that require students to practice it. Informal ways of doing so
include adding requirements that students self-assess the scores that they believe
they are going to obtain on each submitted assignment. Each quiz or test that
starts with a predicted assessment of an estimated score on the coming evaluation
and ends with a postdicted assessment of the score anticipated after completing
each test or quiz offers an opportunity for practice.
This research employed a knowledge survey (KSSLCI). Instructors often
credit knowledge surveys as sources of information for promoting effective
learning and for improved course design (Nuhfer 1996; Nuhfer and Knipp 2003;
Nicolaysen and Ritterbush 2005; Wirth and Perkins 2005; Wirth, Perkins and
Nuhfer 2005; Clauss and Geedey 2010; Goodson, Slater and Zubovic 2015).
Knowledge surveys promote good class planning (Nuhfer and Knipp 2003),
particularly through aiding employment of tight instructional alignment (Cohen
1987).
In assessments, most scholars report that data obtained from knowledge
surveys prove useful for “closing the loop” and informing future class
modifications to support student learning (Nuhfer et al. 2010; Bell and
Volckmann 2011; Favazzo, Willford and Watson 2014). Others used numerical
arguments to reject knowledge surveys as a useful measure of assessment
(Bowers, Brandon and Hill 2005; Ebert-May and Weber 2006) and offered views
that differed little from those that consigned self-assessed learning measures to
random noise (Porter 2012, 2013).
To employ numerical analyses to resolve the disagreement about whether
knowledge surveys offer valid assessments for measures of student learning
required a study that furnished a critical mass of data obtained from closely
aligned instruments of documented reliability. The database employed in this
paper, which is that used in Nuhfer et al. 2016a and Nuhfer 2015, meets that
requirement.
Pre-course knowledge surveys provide a record of predicted self-assessments
about content that participants do not yet fully understand. Post-course knowledge
surveys provide a record of postdicted self-assessed competence about content on
which participants are now better informed. The results shown in this paper
indicate that collective self-assessments offer a valid measure that is significantly
related to the true competencies of the populace as a whole. When people
understand the challenge to which they self-assess their competence, these self-

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

25

Numeracy, Vol. 10 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4

assessments are usually valid estimates of performance that they can demonstrate.
Designing course materials that improve learners’ metacognitive abilities may be
one of the most productive ways to use the content of any discipline to promote
adult intellectual development.

Conclusions
We tested three competing hypotheses regarding self-assessment by analyzing a
large dataset (N = 1154) that registered reliable paired self-assessed competence
ratings and demonstrated competence proficiency scores. The first hypothesis,
which proposes self-assessed estimates of proficiency to be random noise, proved
untenable.
Our results contradicted the generally accepted second hypothesis, which
proposes: (a) peoples’ self-assessed competence ratings show a pronounced bias
toward overestimations of their actual abilities and (b) low-proficiency performers
are those most prone to egregious overestimations. The prevalent acceptance of
this second hypothesis rests largely on the interpretation of patterns yielded by the
Kruger-Dunning-type graphical format. Our analyses revealed that these patterns
invite misinterpretations of data traceable to overlooked aspects of numeracy. By
studying categorical data from known experts and novices, we confirmed that
qualified experts are indeed more skillful in self-assessment than are novices.
However, our study refuted two tenets of the second hypothesis by showing that
(a) no strong propensity exists toward overconfidence in self-assessment ratings
and (b) few people (about 5%) merit their being characterized as “unskilled and
unaware of it.”
Our study permitted creating a quantitative classification scale for selfassessment skills and making a detailed characterization of the skills of a
population sampled from higher education. Our results supported the third
hypotheses by confirming that (a) peoples’ self-assessed competence generally
accords with their demonstrated proficiency and (b) peoples’ frequencies of selfassessed underestimation of their competence are similar to their frequencies of
overestimation. Both qualities held true for novices and experts, and our data from
undergraduate college students indicated that, on average, women seem
significantly better at self-assessment than do men.
Metacognitive self-assessment is a quality that is measurable and meaningful.
However, deprecating self-assessment by deeming it as noise or meaningless
nonsense is partly responsible for why teaching self-assessment and tracking
gains acquired by practice remains widely neglected in higher education.
In much of the peer-reviewed self-assessment literature, we believe we have
found key weaknesses in the numeracy employed during nearly two decades of
collecting, presenting, and interpreting self-assessment data. Because of
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insufficient attention to numeracy, current prevalent explanations of the nature of
human self-assessment seem to rest on a tenuous foundation.
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